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Justin Driver

Reactionary Rhetoric and Liberal Legal Academia
abstract. As celebrations mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is
essential to recover the arguments mainstream critics made in opposing what has become a
sacrosanct piece of legislation. Prominent legal scholarship now appears to misapprehend the
nature of that mainstream opposition, contending it assumed more aggressive forms than it
actually did. Upon examining the actual arguments respected figures wielded against the Civil
Rights Act during the 1960s, certain patterns of argumentation become almost immediately
apparent. Mainstream critics consistently opposed the legislation not by challenging it head on,
but instead by employing three standard arguments that Professor Albert O. Hirschman’s The
Rhetoric of Reaction identified as sounding variously in perversity, futility, and jeopardy. In
addition to demonstrating how Hirschman’s taxonomy illuminates mainstream opposition to
the Civil Rights Act, this essay proceeds to argue that modern legal academia accords The
Rhetoric of Reaction inadequate attention. That is so because the forms of argument Hirschman
explored now frequently appear in what would initially seem an improbable place: the
scholarship of liberal constitutional law professors. Left-leaning legal scholars often propose
revised assessments of high-profile Supreme Court opinions, asserting that—properly
understood—those opinions have had perverse effects, ended up being futile, or jeopardized
some larger achievement. Legal scholars also deploy such reactionary rhetoric prospectively,
warning about the dangers that they assert will accompany future efforts to issue progressive
judicial decisions. Given the prevalence of reactionary rhetoric among liberal law professors, it is
crucial both to grapple with the reasons that may explain its current ascendance and to identify
some of the undesirable consequences that could flow from its common usage.

author. Professor, University of Texas School of Law. I am grateful to the editors of the
Yale Law Journal for organizing this Symposium to honor the fiftieth anniversary of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the publication of Bruce Ackerman’s We the People, Volume 3: The Civil
Rights Revolution (2014). In addition, I owe gratitude to Laura Ferry, Jacob Gersen, Pratheepan
Gulasekaram, Sanford Levinson, and Lucas Powe for helpful comments on previous drafts.
David Friedman, Katie Kinsey, Kyle Kreshover, Patrick Leahy, Kelsey Pfleger, Jim Powers, Tyler
Runge, and Steven Seybold provided unusually valuable research assistance. I completed this
essay while I was the Herman Phleger Visiting Professor at Stanford Law School.

2616

reactionary rhetoric and liberal legal academia

essay contents
introduction

2618

i. sketching reactionary rhetoric

2622

ii. applying reactionary rhetoric

2625

iii. exploring reactionary rhetoric in liberal legal academia

2630

A. Illustrations
B. Explanations
C. Implications
conclusion

2631
2634
2637
2641

2617

the yale law journal

123:2616

2014

introduction
Today, as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 approaches its fiftieth anniversary, it
occupies an exalted position in the nation’s legal consciousness.1 Perhaps none
of the Act’s provisions is held in higher esteem than Title II, the public
accommodations measure that prohibits owners of hotels, motels, and
restaurants from excluding black patrons.2 Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky
received an object lesson in Title II’s sacrosanct status four years ago when he
expressed skepticism about the wisdom of requiring businesses to serve
customers without regard to race.3 Although Paul emphasized that he loathed
racism, he nevertheless speculated that protecting individual freedom might
require protecting even the freedom of business owners who wish to practice
racial discrimination.4 Predictably, the comments generated a firestorm.5
Among his many critics from across the political spectrum, White House Press
Secretary Robert Gibbs flatly asserted that such musings had become unfit for
polite society: “I think the issues that many fought for in the ’50s and the ’60s
were settled a long time ago in landmark [civil rights] legislation. And a
discussion about whether or not you support those [measures] . . . shouldn’t
have a place in our political dialogue in 2010.”6 Paul himself would soon appear
to share Gibbs’s assessment, as he sought to end the conflict by issuing a
statement indicating he would not support any effort to repeal the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.7 To question Title II’s legitimacy in the modern era, it seems
unmistakably clear, is to adopt a position well outside the mainstream.
Opposing Title II these days is a little like opposing motherhood, apple pie, or
fireworks on the Fourth of July.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C. (2006)).
Id. §§ 201-07 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a (2006)).
See Sam Tanenhaus, Rand Paul and the Perils of Textbook Libertarianism, N.Y. TIMES, May 23,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/23/weekinreview/23tanenhaus.html.
See id.
See id.
Press Briefing by Robert Gibbs, White House Press Sec’y (May 20, 2010), http://www
.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/press-briefing-20100520#transcript.
See Susan Davis, Rand Paul Taking Heat for Civil Rights Act Comments, WALL ST. J. (May 20,
2010, 8:44 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/05/20/rand-paul-taking-heat-for-civil
-rights-act-comments. Senator Paul’s efforts in 2010 to extinguish the Title II controversy
have not put the matter wholly to rest. See Sam Tanenhaus & Jim Rutenberg, Rand Paul’s
Mixed Inheritance, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/26/us
/politics/rand-pauls-mixed-inheritance.html (noting that Paul recently assured an audience
that he had “never wavered” in supporting Title II).
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Yet it was not always so. When the nation was actively contemplating
whether to include a public accommodations provision in the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, many people who were squarely part of the nation’s mainstream
culture opposed the measure. Now that Title II has become almost universally
celebrated, it may be tempting to believe that the only contemporaneous
opposition arrived in the form of relatively unvarnished appeals to racial
bigotry and open suggestions of black inferiority. To be clear, such statements
do appear intermittently in the public record from the 1960s. Among elected
officials, for instance, Congressman John Bell Williams of Mississippi
condemned Title II from the floor of the House of Representatives, and in so
doing descended into patently objectionable racial oratory. Rather than
pushing for equal access to public accommodations, Williams contended, civil
rights organizations should instead “devote their talents to the upgrading of
morality among the members of the Negro race, [which] could make a
significant contribution to the good of all mankind.”8 Williams asserted that if
the organizations successfully rechanneled their energy into improving black
morality then “they would discover a perceptible change in the attitude of
white people, and their economic condition would be improved.”9 Williams’s
speech also linked the struggle for racial equality in public accommodations to
the black community’s supposed propensity for illegitimacy and criminality,
two issues that segregationists frequently invoked dating back to at least the
mid-1950s.10 Yet, Williams’s charged racial language is conspicuous within
public debates about the Civil Rights Act of 1964 precisely because Title II’s
opponents typically eschewed such language.
If mainstream opponents of Title II did not—for whatever reasons—
generally avail themselves of racially derogatory modes of argumentation, the
question becomes: what sorts of arguments did they typically advance in
opposing racial equality in public accommodations? Five decades after
President Lyndon Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 into law, it is
illuminating to recover the actual, rather than the putative, nature of
mainstream opposition to Title II in the terms that opposition was articulated
contemporaneously. This exercise in historical recovery is urgent because even
some of our most sophisticated scholars of constitutional law now seem to

8.
9.
10.

110 CONG. REC. 2786 (1963) (statement of Rep. Williams).
Id.
Id. See also Justin Driver, Supremacies and the Southern Manifesto, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1053, 1084
(2014) (observing that during the post-Brown era even sophisticated opponents of school
integration bolstered their arguments by citing allegedly high rates of illegitimacy and crime
among black citizens).
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misapprehend that opposition, assuming it found articulation in more
aggressive forms than it actually did.11
Upon examining the arguments widely respected figures deployed in
attacking Title II, certain patterns of argumentation become almost
immediately apparent—at least when viewed through modern spectacles.
During the mid-1960s, mainstream critics of public accommodations
legislation consistently expressed their opposition in formulations that will
appear familiar to readers of Professor Albert O. Hirschman’s magnificent
volume from 1991, The Rhetoric of Reaction.12 Hirschman contended that
opponents of progressive reforms have, for more than two centuries, availed
themselves of three standard types of counterarguments, which he classifies as
sounding variously in perversity, futility, and jeopardy.13 When liberals
propose ideas for social improvement, Hirschman observed, opponents
frequently react to the proposal by asserting it will: intensify the very problem
it attempts to remedy, and thus prove perverse; fail to achieve the desired
reform, and thus prove futile; and/or threaten to undermine a more
fundamental value, and thus jeopardize some earlier, hard-earned societal
accomplishment.14 Although Hirschman did not address the debate over public
accommodations legislation, mainstream opponents of that legislation—
including such figures as Robert Bork, Barry Goldwater, and William
Rehnquist—repeatedly employed Hirschman’s modes of reactionary rhetoric
during the mid-1960s. Tracing the prevalence of reactionary rhetoric among
notable opponents of public accommodations legislation should highlight the
significance of Hirschman’s insights for law professors—a group that, despite
demonstrating considerable familiarity with part of Hirschman’s oeuvre, has
paid insufficient attention to The Rhetoric of Reaction.15

11.

12.

13.
14.
15.

See 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 6 (2014)
(asserting that Senator Barry Goldwater launched a “frontal assault on the Civil Rights Act
of 1964”). But, as will become apparent, Senator Goldwater’s opposition was considerably
more indirect than the “frontal assault” metaphor connotes.
ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, FUTILITY, JEOPARDY
(1991). For an incisive biography of Hirschman’s fascinating life, see JEREMY ADELMAN,
WORLDLY PHILOSOPHER: THE ODYSSEY OF ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN (2013).
HIRSCHMAN, supra note 12, at 7.
Id.
Law professors, particularly scholars of democratic politics, often cite Hirschman’s best
known book, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States.
See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, 62 DUKE L.J. 1349, 1349 (2013)
(referring to “Hirschman’s famous work”). I do not suggest, of course, that law professors
know nothing at all of Hirschman’s examination of reactionary rhetoric. See, e.g., James E.
Fleming, The Incredible Shrinking Constitutional Theory: From the Partial Constitution to the
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Legal academia’s relative inattention to The Rhetoric of Reaction is
regrettable not least because those forms of argument today appear with great
frequency in what would seem to be an unlikely place: the scholarship of liberal
law professors. Prominent left-leaning law professors often criticize widely
celebrated Supreme Court opinions that sought to vindicate the rights of
marginalized groups as fruitless, because they have had perverse effects, ended
up being futile, or jeopardized some larger achievement. Liberal law professors
do not, moreover, limit the application of such reactionary rhetoric to Supreme
Court opinions that were decided many years earlier. Instead, they also apply
such rhetoric prospectively, warning about the dangers they contend will
accompany future judicial interventions to protect minority rights. The legal
left’s reactionary rhetoric toward the Supreme Court has played a substantial
role in shaping what might be termed the Age of Judicial Skepticism, a time
when legal academia views the possibilities of social reform by the judiciary less
with twinkling eyes than with jaundiced ones. Given the prominence of
reactionary rhetoric among liberal law professors, it seems imperative to
grapple with the reasons that may account for its current ascendance in such a
seemingly improbable location. In addition, it is crucial to identify the costs
that may result from liberal legal academia’s excessive invocation of reactionary
rhetoric in scholarship about the judiciary.
The balance of this essay proceeds as follows. Part I briefly sketches
Hirschman’s taxonomy of reactionary rhetoric. Part II maps Hirschman’s
taxonomy onto contemporaneous mainstream opposition to public
accommodations measures. Part III, the heart of the essay, widens the frame to
chronicle the prevalence of reactionary rhetoric in present-day liberal legal
academia, offer some potential explanations for its prominence in such an
improbable place, and identify some of the undesirable consequences that may
stem from reactionary rhetoric’s stronghold among liberal law professors. A
short conclusion follows.

Minimal Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2885, 2913-16 (2007); Adriaan Lanni & Adrian
Vermeule, Precautionary Constitutionalism in Ancient Athens, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 893, 904-09
(2013); Sanford Levinson, Still Complacent After All These Years: Some Rumination on the
Continuing Need for a “New Political Science,” 89 B.U. L. REV. 409, 415-17 (2009); Richard H.
Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1611-12 (1999); Adrian
Vermeule, Does Commerce Clause Review Have Perverse Effects?, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1325, 1325-28
(2001); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Has the Americans with Disabilities Act Reduced Employment for
People with Disabilities?, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 527, 559 (2004) (book review). I
suggest merely that law professors draw upon The Rhetoric of Reaction too infrequently. A
Westlaw search suggests legal academics cite Exit, Voice, and Loyalty about eleven times
more frequently than they cite The Rhetoric of Reaction.
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At the outset, it is essential to make clear that liberal law professors’
reactionary rhetoric appears in a severely circumscribed location, and in no way
extends to their entire worldview. While legal liberals express deep skepticism
about the judiciary’s capacity to issue significant progressive opinions, they do
not doubt that meaningful social progress can occur through other
mechanisms. Instead of relying on the judiciary, they suggest that elected
officials, at the state or federal levels, must undertake significant social reforms
themselves if those reforms are ultimately to prove successful. In this critical
sense, then, liberal law professors who use reactionary rhetoric in analyzing
progressive Supreme Court opinions (either actual or hypothetical) strike a
fundamentally different pose toward the possibility of reform than do the more
expansive critics Hirschman explored in The Rhetoric of Reaction. Despite this
important difference, liberal legal academia’s fascination with reactionary
rhetoric demands investigation because such an undertaking yields valuable
insight into the modern American constitutional order.
i. sketching reactionary rhetoric
Toward the beginning of The Rhetoric of Reaction, Albert Hirschman
observed that the modern world is often temperamentally and intellectually
receptive to the ultimate goals of proposed progressive measures.16
Accordingly, when progressives advance ideas for social reform, opponents
seldom launch frontal assaults on the overarching objective.17 Instead,
Hirschman contended, opponents frequently react to progressive proposals
and enactments by embracing the reform’s theoretical aims, but
simultaneously raising any of three common rhetorical counterthrusts designed
to defeat the measures.18 These three modes of reactionary rhetoric, according
to Hirschman, stretch back at least to the French Revolution and have carried
right through the Reagan Revolution.19
First, the perversity thesis—which Hirschman regarded as the most widely
used and most effective reactionary trope20—argues that the proposed reform
would exacerbate the very condition that it aims to alleviate. Under the
perversity view, measures are bound to succeed in making matters worse. As

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

HIRSCHMAN, supra note 12, at 11.
Id. (“Given this state of public opinion, reactionaries are not likely to launch an all-out
attack on that objective.”).
Id. at 3-8, 11.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 140.
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Hirschman put the point in his elegant prose: “[T]he attempt to push society
in a certain direction will result in its moving all right, but in the opposite
direction.”21 Opponents of reform who emphasize perverse effects are, as
Hirschman recognized, deploying an extreme variant of an unintended
consequences argument.22 In the extraordinarily volatile conception of the
world in which perversity thrives, society ought to be careful about what
problems it sets in its sights because: “Everything backfires.”23 Charles Murray’s
Losing Ground, which offers a critique of welfare benefits, may contain the
single most evocative encapsulation of the perversity thesis: “We tried to
provide for the poor and produced more poor instead. We tried to remove the
barriers to escape from poverty and inadvertently built a trap.”24
Second, the futility thesis, which is almost diametrically opposed to the
perversity thesis, contends that efforts to reform society will fail to produce
change altogether, or produce only superficial change, because of deep-seated
societal foundations that simply cannot be altered.25 Where perversity rhetoric
assumes a world brimming with uncertainty, futility rhetoric sees a world of
intractability.26 “In [the futility] scenario,” Hirschman explained, “human
actions or intentions are frustrated, not because they unleash a series of side
effects, but because they pretend to change the unchangeable, because they
ignore the basic structures of society.”27 Mere mortals are powerless to
transform ironclad laws. Under the futility view, the status quo is king, and he
cannot be dethroned.28 The futility argument’s patron saint is Edmund Burke,
the French Revolution skeptic who famously warned would-be reformers to
recall “the eternal constitution of things.”29 Indeed, it is no accident, in

21.
22.
23.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 11 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 36.
Id. at 12; see id. at 76 (arguing that advocates of the perversity claim do not blame the
reformers whose actions yield undesired consequences, but instead characterize them as
“lacking . . . in elementary understanding of the complex interactions of social and economic
forces”).
Id. at 29 (quoting CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICA’S SOCIAL POLICY, 19501980, at 9 (1984)).
See id. at 7, 43.
See id. at 76, 154.
Id. at 72.
See id. at 44.
See id. at 154 (internal quotation marks omitted); EDMUND BURKE, LETTER TO A MEMBER OF
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (1791), reprinted in 8 THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND
BURKE: THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 1790-1794, at 332 (L.G. Mitchell ed., 1989).
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Hirschman’s estimation, that the futility thesis received its classic articulation
in the French Revolution’s aftermath: Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.30
Third, the jeopardy thesis, while allowing that the proposed policy may
well be desirable when viewed in isolation, asserts that implementing the
reform would be too costly because it would threaten prior, more valuable
societal achievements.31 If we adopt policy Y, the jeopardy view asserts, then we
necessarily endanger accomplishment X. According to Hirschman, opponents
of reform typically suggest that progressive policies will jeopardize liberty,
democracy, or perhaps even both at the same time.32 Adherents of jeopardy
rhetoric frequently suggest that the contested policy is merely the opening
salvo in what will become a barrage of reform. The jeopardy thesis
communicates this idea of escalation, Hirschman noted, with a variety of
metaphors that pervade popular discourse: the thin edge of the wedge, a foot
in the door, the tip of the iceberg, the camel’s nose under the tent, and,
inevitably, the slippery slope.33 “The wealth of metaphors testifies to the
popularity of arguing against an action on the ground that, even though
unobjectionable in itself, it will have unhappy consequences,” Hirschman
wrote. Under the jeopardy view, it would seem that nearly all roads lead to
serfdom.34
Hirschman included several caveats in The Rhetoric of Reaction, but only a
couple warrant addressing here. As an initial matter, Hirschman allowed that
reactionary rhetoric is not the exclusive province of reactionaries. To the
contrary, non-reactionaries can, under particular circumstances, feel moved to
advance such arguments. “Whenever conservatives or reactionaries find
themselves in power and are able to propose and carry out their programs and
policies, they may in turn be attacked by liberals or progressives along the lines
of the perversity, futility, and jeopardy theses,” Hirschman wrote.35 Still,
Hirschman insisted, even if reactionary rhetoric does not appear exclusively on
the right, such rhetoric predominantly arises from that end of the political

30.
31.
32.
33.

34.
35.

For those few readers who possess an even poorer grasp of French than I have, the
translation runs: The more things change, the more they stay the same.
See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 12, at 7, 84.
See id. at 84.
See id. at 83. For legal scholarship examining slippery slope arguments, see Frederick
Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1985); and Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms
of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026 (2003).
See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 12, at 110-13. Cf. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM
(1944).
HIRSCHMAN, supra note 12, at 7.
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spectrum.36 In addition, Hirschman noted that his examination was primarily
concerned with classifying and exploring recurrent rhetorical tropes, not
assessing the underlying validity of those arguments within discrete historical
contexts. Hirschman understood that simply because “an argument is used
repeatedly is no proof, to be sure, that it is wrong in any particular instance.”37
Despite this qualification, Hirschman maintained that his analysis
demonstrated that the three reactionary theses are frequently trotted out in
instances where dire warnings about the dangers of reform were ultimately
revealed to be unfounded.38
ii. applying reactionary rhetoric
It seems difficult to imagine a historical context that more vividly
demonstrates reactionary rhetoric’s overuse than the resistance to public
accommodations legislation that was articulated during the mid-1960s. During
that era, Barry Goldwater, William Rehnquist, and—most dazzlingly of all—
Robert Bork criticized public accommodations laws with the aid of reactionary
rhetoric. Despite their dire warnings to the contrary fifty years ago, we now
know very well that eliminating racial discrimination in public
accommodations did not cause the heavens to fall. What may be somewhat
surprising, though, is how quickly that lesson became virtually unassailable.
In June 1964, Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona delivered perhaps the
most high-profile speech opposing Title II, only one month before he would
officially become the Republican Party’s presidential nominee.39 Goldwater’s
speech, delivered from the Senate floor, did not frontally attack the ideal of
racial equality; to the contrary, Goldwater assured listeners he personally
opposed racial discrimination and noted that he had supported earlier civil

36.

37.
38.
39.

See id. at 7-8 (“Nevertheless, the arguments are most typical of conservative attacks on
existing or proposed progressive polices and their major protagonists have been
conservative thinkers . . . .”).
Id. at 166.
See id. (observing that “the arguments I have identified and reviewed are intellectually
suspect on several counts”).
For contemporary newspaper coverage of Goldwater’s speech opposing Title II, see Anthony
Lewis, The Courts Spurn Goldwater View, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1964, at 18 (contending that
“[t]he constitutional argument made by Senator Barry Goldwater today in opposing the
civil rights bill is one that stopped winning cases in the courts in the late nineteen-thirties”);
and Charles Mohr, Goldwater Says He’ll Vote ‘No’ on the Rights Measure, N.Y. TIMES, June 19,
1964, at 1.
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rights measures.40 Despite this avowed aversion to racial prejudice, Goldwater
opposed Title II because he contended that enacting the measure would
jeopardize other, essential accomplishments that made the United States a
great nation. Predictably, the overarching value that Goldwater identified Title
II as threatening was the country’s commitment to individual liberty.
Goldwater opposed Title II, he said, because “[t]his is the time to attend to the
liberties of all,” and attributed his vote to concern “for the entire Nation, for
the freedom of all who live in it and for all who will be born into it.”41
Elaborating upon his claim that Title II imperiled liberty, Goldwater provided
some specific illustrations. Monitoring compliance with Title II, Goldwater
declared, would demand “a Federal police force of mammoth proportions,”
effectively necessitating “the creation of a police state,” and helping lead to “the
destruction of a free society.”42 On a related note, Goldwater suggested that
authorizing Title II permitted what he called “the Central or Federal
Government” to usurp authority that the Constitution assigned to the states,
often deemed better protectors of individual autonomy than Congress.43 In a
variation on these relatively straightforward jeopardy arguments, Goldwater
added a perversity angle by contending that some of the citizens whose liberty
could be deprived by governmental overreach were the same black people that
Title II aimed to help. Validating the public accommodations measure,
Goldwater argued, would authorize congressional action “which could
ultimately destroy the freedom of all American citizens, including the freedoms
of the very persons whose feelings and whose liberties are the major subject of
this legislation.”44
William Rehnquist, then an Arizona lawyer in private practice who was
active in Republican circles, played a role in shaping Goldwater’s approach to
the 1964 Civil Rights Act.45 But Rehnquist’s opposition to public
accommodations measures exceeded even that of Goldwater. Where Goldwater
had supported public accommodations legislation in Phoenix, Arizona,

40.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

110 CONG. REC. 14,318-19 (1964) (statement of Sen. Goldwater) (“I am unalterably opposed
to discrimination or segregation on the basis of race, color, or creed, or on any other basis
. . . .”).
Id. at 14,319.
Id.
Id. Goldwater’s federalism argument may have been somewhat sincere, as he supported
Arizona’s public accommodations legislation.
Id.
See RICK PERLSTEIN, BEFORE THE STORM: BARRY GOLDWATER AND THE UNMAKING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSENSUS 363 (Nation Books 2009) (2001).
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Rehnquist fought that legislation aggressively.46 Rehnquist not only appeared
before the Phoenix City Council to oppose the measure, but he also wrote a
letter to the Arizona Republic articulating his concerns after the City Council
voted unanimously to adopt the ordinance.47 Rehnquist began his City Council
testimony with a textbook formulation of the jeopardy thesis. “I would like to
speak in opposition to the proposed ordinance because I believe that the values
that it sacrifices are greater than the values which it gives,” he said.48 By
Rehnquist’s calculations, the ordinance’s tax on “our historic individual
freedom” could not possibly be offset by any benefits: “To the extent that we
substitute, for the decision of each businessman as to how he shall select his
customers, the command of the government telling him how he must select
them, we give up a measure of our traditional freedom.”49 Rehnquist
supplemented his jeopardy argument with an argument based on futility,
claiming that Phoenix’s public accommodations law was powerless to affect the
fundamental issue it sought to address: “The ordanance [sic], of course, does
not and cannot remove the basic indignity to the Negro which results from
refusing to serve him; that indignity stems from the state of mind of the
proprietor who refuses to treat each potential customer on his own merits.”50
For Rehnquist, racial prejudice was too resilient, too deep-seated of a force to
be tamed with mere legislation. “Unable to correct the source of the indignity
to the Negro, it redresses the situation by placing a separate indignity on the
proprietor,” Rehnquist explained. “It is as barren of accomplishment in what it
gives to the Negro as in what it takes from the proprietor. The unwanted
customer and the disliked proprietor are left glowering at one another across
the lunch counter.”51
Although Goldwater and Rehnquist formidably deployed reactionary
language in opposing public accommodations legislation, the virtuoso of
reactionary rhetoric in this realm was surely Robert H. Bork, then a professor
at Yale Law School. Bork’s well-known New Republic essay from 1963 included
a few, fleeting invocations of reactionary tropes as he condemned the measure

46.
47.

48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
William H. Rehnquist, Public Accommodations Law Passage Is Called “Mistake,” ARIZ. REP.
(Phoenix), June 4, 1964, reprinted in Nominations of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F.
Powell, Jr.: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 307 (1971) [hereinafter
Rehnquist and Powell Nominations].
Id. at 305.
Id. at 307.
Id.
Id.
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that ultimately became Title II.52 But Bork’s true masterpiece of reactionary
rhetoric did not appear until the following year, in a Chicago Tribune article
that law professors today seem to have virtually forgotten.53 Where Goldwater
and Rehnquist contented themselves with using two of Hirschman’s three
tropes, Bork’s Chicago Tribune article completed a relatively rare trifecta of
reactionary rhetoric.
Bork opened his article by conceding that “private racial prejudice is
unjust,” but quickly insisted that this allowance could not be conflated with
resolving the question of whether the federal government should enact Title
II.54 In pursuing his jeopardy claim, Bork did not so much diminish the
importance of racial equality as he did elevate the importance of liberty:
“[F]reedom is a value of such high priority and may so easily slip away that a
very heavy burden of proof rests upon those who ask us to sacrifice it to other
ends.”55 In addition to auguring ill for personal freedom, Bork also contended
that enacting Title II spelled doom for federalism: “If Congress can dictate the
selection of customers in a remote Georgia diner because the canned soup once
crossed a state line, federalism . . . is dead.”56 Implementing Title II would,
according to Bork, necessarily require federal judges to confront a wide array of
line-drawing problems in distinguishing among various types of businesses,
threatening “government by judiciary.”57 Applying a hallmark of jeopardy
argumentation, Bork insisted that Title II must be understood as merely the
wedge’s thin end. “The accommodations . . . provision[] of the civil rights bill
cannot be viewed in isolation,” Bork wrote, “but must be assessed as only a
modest first step in a broad program of coerced social change.”58 Although
Bork’s jeopardy moves certainly demonstrate competence, standing alone, they
would fall well short of the spectacular.
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See Robert Bork, Civil Rights—A Challenge, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 31, 1963, at 21, 22 (invoking
the jeopardy thesis by contending proponents of public accommodations legislation elided
the “cost in freedom” and the “loss in a vital area of personal liberty”).
Robert H. Bork, Against the Bill, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 1, 1964, at 1. A search of Westlaw’s law
review database turned up exactly one article that has cited Bork’s Chicago Tribune piece. See
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Noah’s Curse: How Religion Often Conflates Status, Belief, and
Conduct to Resist Antidiscrimination Norms, 45 GA. L. REV. 657, 675 n.92 (2011).
Bork, supra note 53, at 1.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see id. (“How could a court decide that the new constitutional requirement applies to a
motion picture theater but not to a bowling alley, to a restaurant but not to a private club, to
an inn-keeper or gas station operator but not to an accountant, a lawyer, or a doctor?”).
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Where Bork distinguished himself from his contemporaries, though, was
in his willingness to claim that enacting Title II simultaneously courted both
perversity and futility. Hirschman identified the high degree of difficulty that
traditionally accompanies using these arguments in tandem:
It is of course difficult to argue at one and the same time that a certain
movement for social change will be sharply counterproductive, in line
with the perversity thesis, and that it will have no effect at all, in line
with the futility thesis. For this reason the two arguments are ordinarily
made by different critics—though not always.59
Difficult, but not impossible. If it is true, as Hirschman suggested, that
combining the perversity and the futility theses “requires special gifts of
sophistry,”60 then there can be no question that Bork was an unusually gifted
sophist. As to perversity, Bork claimed Title II could “worsen rather than
improve the relationships of racial . . . groups in American society,” and the
consequent rise in “racial . . . tensions may be quite the opposite of what its
advocates intended.”61 Title II may hurt racial relations, Bork averred, because
the measure sent the message that race was an appropriate topic for overt
legislation, and ensuing litigation would pit citizens of different races against
one other. “Political struggle will increasingly take place between groups
bearing racial . . . identifications,” Bork wrote. “Alliances will be sought and
enmities formed on such lines. The process has begun already, and its
implications for the future of our society are nothing short of appalling.”62 As
to futility, Bork contended that, if Title II were enacted, enforcement of the
measure would almost certainly prove impossible. “There are tens of thousands
of commercial establishments covered by this law in the South alone,” Bork
wrote. “If the law is to mean anything, it must be enforced not only when a
Negro is turned away from a lunch counter but also when he is treated in a way
that amounts to an effective denial of service.”63 Such complications would
inevitably overwhelm Title II’s enforcement mechanisms; and if the measure
went unenforced, disrespect for the law would follow—a prospect that led Bork
to label nonenforcement “the most dangerous alternative before us.”64 In one
particularly spellbinding sentence, Bork managed to combine the futility and

59.
60.
61.
62.
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HIRSCHMAN, supra note 12, at 45.
Id. at 62.
Bork, supra note 53, at 1.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
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perversity arguments into a potent cocktail of caution. Title II, Bork warned,
would “[p]rove impossible to enforce effectively, and so have deleterious
effects both upon law observance generally and prospects for peaceful solutions
to racial problems in particular.”65 As befitting a Yale Law School professor,
Bork’s was a bravura performance—even if it was in the service of a cause few
of his colleagues would have cheered.
Examining these invocations of reactionary rhetoric some five decades later,
it is jarring to encounter mainstream figures condemning legislation that is
now beyond reproach. Today, reasonable minds simply cannot differ on the
legitimacy and the desirability of racial equality in public accommodations.
What is perhaps most remarkable about this general state of affairs is how
quickly it emerged. As soon as the early 1970s, any lawyer who hoped to win
Senate confirmation needed to pledge allegiance to public accommodations
laws. In 1971, a mere seven years after Title II’s debut, Bork renounced his
earlier position in his confirmation hearings to become Solicitor General.66
That same year, Rehnquist renounced his earlier opposition to public
accommodations measures in his confirmation hearings to become an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court.67 In the course of history, seven years amounts
to the blink of an eye. But it is long enough to carry views that were part of the
mainstream into the backwaters.
iii. exploring reactionary rhetoric in liberal legal
academia
Within the corridors of law schools today, liberal scholars frequently
invoke reactionary rhetoric to warn about the dangers of Supreme Court
Justices seeking to vindicate the rights of marginalized groups. Left-leaning
legal scholars, with seemingly evermore frequency and urgency, instruct
individuals who are genuinely interested in aiding society’s outcasts to turn
away from the courthouse and instead to turn toward the statehouse. Although
liberal law professors generally applaud the quest for a more egalitarian society,
many of them harbor deep reservations about the judiciary’s ability to play a
significant role in delivering such a society. When Supreme Court Justices
undertake significant egalitarian missions, many liberal law professors suggest,
history demonstrates that the outcome is likely to be an unhappy one because

65.
66.
67.

Id. at 1.
Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 152-54 (1987).
Rehnquist and Powell Nominations, supra note 47, at 76-77, 156.
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they will injure the cause they intend to aid, fail to achieve the underlying goal,
and/or endanger some deeper value. The rhetoric of perversity, futility, and
jeopardy now so suffuses liberal legal academia that cataloguing every
prominent scholarly invocation would itself constitute an exercise in futility.
Accordingly, the following high-profile examples should be understood as
merely illustrative, not exhaustive.
A. Illustrations
Liberal legal scholars frequently suggest that some of the Supreme Court’s
most well-known opinions have caused perverse outcomes. Professor Cass
Sunstein has underscored the dangers of judicial perversity—or what he calls
“unintended adverse consequences”68—and also has provided the classic
formulation: “[J]udicial involvement may well undermine the very causes that
it purports to help.”69 How might judicial involvement in a social cause
become counterproductive? Sunstein has explained: “The Court’s decision may
activate opposing forces and demobilize the political actors that it favors. It
may produce an intense social backlash, in the process delegitimating itself as
well as the goal it seeks to promote.”70 In this same vein, Professor Jeffrey
Rosen has cautioned that Supreme Court opinions that resist majority
preferences “have tended to provoke backlashes that often undermine the very
causes the judges are attempting to advance.”71 Liberal scholars cite the Court’s
ill-fated attempt to eliminate capital punishment during the 1970s as a chief
instance of the perversity thesis in action.72 On this account, the Justices
observed dwindling use of the death penalty throughout the nation, and they
sought in Furman v. Georgia73 to abolish the practice once and for all. But in
response to Furman, many state legislatures enacted new capital punishment
statutes. Thus, in their effort to kill the death penalty, these narratives suggest,
the Justices unwittingly revived the death penalty. Liberal scholars offer a
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CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 59
(1999).
Cass R. Sunstein, What Judge Bork Should Have Said, 23 CONN. L. REV. 205, 206 (1991).
SUNSTEIN, supra note 68, at 59.
JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS SERVE AMERICA, at xii
(2006).
See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 287
(2009); Corinna Barrett Lain, Furman Fundamentals, 82 WASH. L. REV. 1, 46-55 (2007).
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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somewhat similar account of the Court’s involvement with abortion.74 Under
this view, the nation was already in the process of adopting less restrictive laws
on abortion when the Court issued its far-reaching opinion in Roe v. Wade.75
Many legal liberals contend that the opinion, however well-intentioned,
imprudently elevated abortion’s social salience and created the modern pro-life
movement. Thus, in seeking to mute the abortion issue, the Justices
inadvertently amplified the abortion issue. If liberally-inclined Justices want
society to advance on divisive social issues, adherents of the perversity thesis
would suggest that the wisest move is frequently for them to remain on the
sidelines.76
Liberal legal scholars also have suggested that when the Supreme Court has
undertaken major attempts at social reform, those efforts have often proven
futile. Professor Sunstein has offered particularly fluent odes to the hazards of
judicial futility: “[E]ven for those sympathetic to many of the Warren Court’s
decisions, there are good reasons to be ambivalent about social reform through
the judiciary. Judges are likely to be ineffectual in promoting social reform;
their methods and procedures are best suited to compensatory justice.”77
Sunstein has also suggested that “[t]he Court may not produce appropriate
social reform even if it seeks to do so.”78 Professor Barry Friedman has offered
perhaps the most extensive and exuberant account of what he regards as the
Supreme Court’s sheer inability to issue durable opinions that clash with
majoritarian preferences: “[T]he expressions of both the hope and the threat of
judicial review rest on a common supposition: that the judiciary even has the
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See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v.
Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 379-82 (1985); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Symposium, Pluralism
and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE
L.J. 1279, 1312-13 (2005).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Declining to mention Professor Michael Klarman’s backlash thesis in the context of
perversity arguments may seem like a glaring omission here. See Michael J. Klarman, How
Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81 (1994). Yet, his
argument is an imperfect fit for the standard perversity narrative. Klarman certainly
contends that Brown eliminated the space for racially moderate politicians in the South (the
backlash portion of his argument). But he also contends that the charged atmosphere
created by Brown led to violent racial confrontations during the 1960s, and that those
confrontations, in turn, mobilized northern support for racially egalitarian legislation (the
counter-backlash portion of the argument). See id. at 82. For Klarman, then, Brown did
advance the struggle for racial equality, even if it did so indirectly.
Sunstein, supra note 69, at 206.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 68, at 59; see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 146
(1993) (“Judicial decisions are often surprisingly ineffective in bringing about social
change.”).
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capacity of running contrary to the will of the majority.”79 On this score,
Friedman asserts, the Supreme Court is plainly incapacitated.80 Liberal scholars
often point to Brown v. Board of Education as a case that reveals the futility of
the Supreme Court’s efforts to achieve meaningful social reform throughout
the country.81 Professor Gerald Rosenberg has influentially contended that
Brown proved ineffectual in desegregating public schools in the South:
“[S]tatistics from the southern states are truly amazing. For ten years, 19541964, virtually nothing happened. Ten years after Brown only 1.2 percent of
black schoolchildren in the South attended school with whites.”82 Rosenberg
suggests that only after Congress gave Brown some teeth with important
legislation in the mid-1960s—Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965—did nontrivial amounts of
desegregation actually occur.83 Liberal academics view the Supreme Court’s
invalidation of school-sponsored prayer in Engel v. Vitale through a similar
lens.84 Despite the Court’s clear commands on the subject, scholars contend,
school-sponsored prayer continues to exist in certain regions of the country
until this very day. A mere judicial opinion, even one from the Supreme Court,
is powerless to counteract deeply held religious practices. Advocates of the
futility thesis suggest that when the Court attempts to go it alone on a
contested social issue, the Justices’ efforts go nowhere.
Although the perversity and futility arguments account for the most
striking instances of reactionary rhetoric in liberal legal academia, left-leaning
scholars also gesture toward jeopardy-based arguments in their assessments of
the Supreme Court. Here, the scholarly claims tend to be connected less to
particular judicial opinions, and more to the outsized role the Court plays on
the American legal landscape. As is generally the case with the jeopardy thesis,
legal scholars identify democracy and liberty as the paramount values that the
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FRIEDMAN, supra note 72, at 370.
See id. (“As must be certainly clear by now, this underlying assumption . . . is deeply
problematic.”).
347 U.S. 483 (1954); see GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 50-51 (1991) (contending that Brown achieved little desegregation);
L. A. Powe, Jr., The Supreme Court, Social Change, and Legal Scholarship, 44 STAN. L. REV.
1615, 1620-21 (1992) (same).
ROSENBERG, supra note 81, at 52.
Id. at 52-54.
370 U.S. 421 (1962); see FRIEDMAN, supra note 72, at 266-67 (noting that many southern
schools featured school-sponsored prayer even after the Court sought to invalidate such
practices); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82
VA. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1996) (same).
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judiciary threatens. In its purer strands, popular constitutionalism can be
understood as claiming that, even if judges issue opinions that liberals applaud,
those opinions nevertheless jeopardize democratic norms.85 Viewed in that
light, popular constitutionalism can be construed as extending, elaborating,
and responding to the phenomenon Alexander Bickel labeled the
“countermajoritarian difficulty.”86 In addition, Professor Friedman, whose
work is expressly framed in response to Bickel, has appeared to suggest other
revered social values that the Supreme Court jeopardizes, particularly when it
issues opinions that contradict majority sentiment.87 The nation’s respect for
judicial review and judicial authority, Friedman has posited, may be
compromised by unpopular opinions:
The most telling reason why the justices might care about public
opinion . . . is simply that they do not have much of a choice. At least,
that is, if they care about preserving the Court’s institutional power,
about having their decisions enforced, about not being disciplined by
politics. Americans have abolished courts, impeached one justice,
regularly defied Court orders, packed the Court, and stripped its
jurisdiction. If the preceding history shows anything, it is that when
judicial decisions wander far from what the public will tolerate, bad
things happen to the Court and the justices.88
Although popular constitutionalism’s strong normative commitments render it
distinguishable from Friedman’s avowedly descriptive undertaking,89 the
projects are linked in highlighting that judicial opinions potentially impair
other values.
B. Explanations
It seems unmistakable that liberal law professors often employ reactionary
rhetoric in discussing the Supreme Court’s ability to deliver progressive
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See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).
See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 18 (2d ed. 1986) (calling judicial review a “deviant institution in the
American democracy”).
See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002).
FRIEDMAN, supra note 72, at 375.
For a contention that Friedman’s book is best understood as containing normative lessons,
see Justin Driver, The Consensus Constitution, 89 TEX. L . REV. 755, 792-93 (2011).
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victories. The question is: Why? Why have left-leaning academics become so
enamored of casting skepticism and doubt on the notion of judicial efficacy
during the last few decades? Answering that question necessarily raises
questions about why academics write what they write, taking us into the realm
of speculation. That is, of course, hazardous terrain, especially when one’s
motivations can sometimes be mysterious even to one’s own self. Nevertheless,
to avoid speculating about the sources that account for such a conspicuous
trend in legal academia would, at least in this particular instance, constitute an
intellectual defalcation.
The first, and most obvious, explanation seems unlikely to generate much
in the way of controversy: Liberal law professors actually believe what they
write about the Supreme Court. On this straightforward account, when leftleaning academics survey the Supreme Court’s efforts to advance progressive
causes in truly contested arenas, they detect little reason for optimism. Here,
academics are simply calling them as they see them. Progressive interventions
have, as Hirschman recognized, at least occasionally in fact led to perversity,
futility, and jeopardy.90 If that statement holds in the world of elected politics,
there is no compelling reason to believe that it would not also hold in the
judicial world.
A second explanation for the trend in liberal academia’s usage of
reactionary rhetoric stems from the nature of the academic enterprise.
Professors often establish their own scholarly agendas at least partially in
response to the generation of scholars who preceded them. If the generation of
liberal scholars who came of age during the Warren Court and in its immediate
wake heralded the Supreme Court’s ability to refashion society, it is not
especially surprising that subsequent liberal scholars would dedicate
themselves to revising that received wisdom.91 As the scholarly pendulum
regarding the Supreme Court’s efficacy began to swing in the opposite
direction, reactionary rhetoric fairly cried out for usage. The perversity
argument, in particular, seems almost irresistible for those possessing the
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See supra text accompanying notes 16-38.
Lucas A. Powe, Jr., has written insightfully about the generational component of scholarly
views on the Warren Court. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN
POLITICS 500-01 (2000). Some of my own scholarship, I hasten to add, can be understood as
participating in an intergenerational dialogue. See, e.g., Driver, supra note 89; Justin Driver,
The Constitutional Conservatism of the Warren Court, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1101 (2012); Justin
Driver, The Significance of the Frontier in American Constitutional Law, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 345
[hereinafter Driver, Significance of the Frontier].
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sensibilities of a legal academic.92 Although Hirschman did not portray the
perversity thesis in these terms, his explanation of its mechanics helps to
capture some of perversity’s appeal for academic audiences: “This is, at first
blush, a daring intellectual maneuver. The structure of the argument is
admirably simple, whereas the claim being made is rather extreme.”93 Later,
Hirschman described the perversity thesis as “[s]imple, intriguing, and
devastating.”94 It seems difficult to imagine any three adjectives to describe
an academic article that would more readily grab law review editors by
their lapels.
A third explanation would attribute reactionary rhetoric’s ascent among
liberal law professors to the changing composition of the federal judiciary. By
the early 1990s, it had become apparent that, as Professor Sunstein expressed
the point, the Warren Court was dead.95 And Sunstein, along with many other
legal liberals, believed that the Warren Court—or even a simulacrum thereof—
was not going to return anytime soon, if ever.96 From the standpoint of one
who is interested in achieving progressive substantive victories and who is also
resigned to a conservative federal judiciary for the foreseeable future, it may
make little sense to highlight the Supreme Court’s ability to achieve its desired
ends. Emboldening a conservative Supreme Court could end in misery for legal
liberals, as it could encourage the institution to invalidate pieces of progressive
legislation. In this context, reactionary rhetoric—by emphasizing the judiciary’s
difficulty in accomplishing its desired ends—becomes legal liberalism’s best
friend.97 Such language, even when directed in retrospect at liberal landmark
opinions, serves in the present day to warn the conservative judiciary to avoid
becoming too ambitious with its plans for society. I take pains to re-emphasize
here that the scholar need not be conscious of attempting to bring about a
subdued conservative judiciary. I am not, in any way, making accusations of
academic bad faith. It hardly seems extravagant to maintain, though, that
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I arrived at this point due to a helpful exchange that I had with Professor Rachel Harmon
long before this piece was conceived.
HIRSCHMAN, supra note 12, at 11.
Id. at 11-12.
Sunstein, supra note 69, at 205 (“The Warren Court is dead.”).
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Spirit of the Laws, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 11, 1991, at 32, 36
(“From the standpoint of the 1990s, the [Warren] Court increasingly appears to be a
historical anomaly, indeed an unprecedented exception to American political traditions: it
was an adjudicative body willing to use the Constitution as an engine of social reform in the
interest of civil rights and civil liberties.”).
Cf. Driver, Significance of the Frontier, supra note 91, at 396-98 (suggesting the liberal
academic veneration of precedent may be partially owed to strategic considerations).
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constitutional law professors are engaged with the work of Supreme Court
Justices and that the effects of this engagement may appear in legal
scholarship. A related, more cynical assessment would suggest, perhaps with
Hirschman,98 that because conservatives control the Supreme Court, liberal
law professors consciously hurl reactionary rhetoric in the hopes of forestalling
a rightward lurch, using the only weapon they have at their disposal.
C. Implications
Whatever the precise explanations for reactionary rhetoric’s rise among
liberal law professors, its prevalence may produce undesirable consequences.
As an initial matter, the ascent of reactionary rhetoric seems likely to instill an
unduly anemic understanding of the Supreme Court’s capacity to promote
social change. In addition, the easy readiness of such language—and the
accompanying narratives—could diminish Supreme Court Justices’ willingness
to issue opinions that protect marginalized groups, even if those opinions
would in fact realize their intended effects.
The leading scholarly invocations of reactionary rhetoric should not
necessarily be accepted as perfectly illustrating the phenomena that some
academics assert. In the death penalty context, for example, Professor Carol
Steiker has questioned the notion that the Supreme Court’s intervention in
Furman needed to have caused perversity, suggesting that the Court
abandoned its efforts to eliminate capital punishment not because it lacked
judicial capacity, but because it lacked judicial will.99 In the abortion context,
similarly, Dean Robert Post and Professor Reva Siegel have suggested Roe may
not have inspired the backlash with which it is so often associated, as the
conflict over abortion had begun simmering well before the opinion was
issued, and did not boil over until well afterward.100 With respect to Brown’s
supposed futility, many scholars have criticized assessing the opinion’s
effectiveness primarily by measuring the amount of desegregation it
immediately achieved because doing so ignores its motivational contributions,
both to the civil rights movement and the landmark civil rights legislation of
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See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 12, at 7 (noting conditions for liberal usage of reactionary
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See Carol S. Steiker, Capital Punishment and Contingency, 125 HARV. L. REV. 760 (2012)
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the 1960s.101 With respect to Engel’s supposed futility, scholarship suggests
that, while the opinion certainly did not eradicate every trace of schoolsponsored prayer throughout the entire nation, many school jurisdictions in
particular regions did in fact abolish the practice after the Court’s opinion.102 In
both Brown and Engel, of course, assertions of judicial futility disregard the
symbolic significance of Supreme Court opinions invalidating practices. And
symbols matter.103 Finally, regarding the amorphous, jeopardy-based
assertions that judicial invalidations of legislation diminish democracy, it is
imperative to recall that judicial opinions can serve to enhance democracy—at
least if that term is not conflated with mere majority rule.104
But even if one were to concede that reactionary rhetoric accurately applied
in some or all of these instances, it is important to appreciate that liberal law
professors sometimes overemploy the tropes, invoking them when the
situation does not warrant it. Although this occasion is not the time to
catalogue a litany of misplaced incantations of reactionary rhetoric, allow me to
detail one particularly telling example. Professor Jeffrey Rosen, writing only
months before the Court decided Romer v. Evans,105 invoked a classic perversity
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See, e.g., 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 229-56 (contending that Brown defined the terms of
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as legal principles to be applied by the courts.”).
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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argument, suggesting that a Supreme Court opinion invalidating Colorado’s
antigay referendum could retard the movement toward gay equality.106 A loss
in Romer should not overly concern advocates of gay equality, Rosen
contended, because judicial victories have a penchant for turning into judicial
defeats: “[A]s the pro-life movement can attest in the wake of Roe v. Wade,
there are worse things to be endured than a dramatic defeat by the Supreme
Court.”107 Further arguing against invalidating the referendum in Romer by
appealing to jeopardy, Rosen contended such a decision would threaten
democracy: “This transitional debate is unlikely to be resolved by judicial fiat,
nor should it be. It should be resolved by reasoned cultural and political
argument.”108 Even after the Court issued its decision in Romer, some
commentary appearing in a (slightly) left-of-center popular publication
appealed to the futility thesis, suggesting the opinion changed just about
nothing. An article in Newsweek asserted: “[S]ymbolism only goes so far. It
doesn’t guarantee housing, medical care or a job—all of which can still be
denied homosexuals simply because they’re gay. In virtually every state and
municipality, that kind of discrimination remains legal and is unaffected by
Romer.”109 Newsweek even speculated that Coloradans might successfully
reenact the invalidated referendum without violating Romer.110 The more
Romer changed things, the more they remained the same. Despite these
cautions, however, the Court in Romer successfully invalidated Colorado’s
antigay referendum, and struck an early, important blow in the constitutional
quest for equality on the basis of sexual orientation.
The misapplication of reactionary rhetoric in Romer suggests that its
prevalence has the potential to distort the Supreme Court’s constitutional
jurisprudence in an ongoing fashion. Supreme Court Justices who thought
Colorado’s referendum was unconstitutional, but who also took reactionary
rhetoric seriously in that case, may well have declined to join Romer. Those
Justices could have reasoned the opinion would retard rather than advance the
cause of gay equality, prove ineffectual in realizing its fundamental aims,
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Jeffrey Rosen, Disoriented, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 23, 1995, at 24, 26.
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See id. (suggesting a technique to sidestep Romer).

2639

the yale law journal

123:2616

2014

and/or threaten democratic norms. For Justices who have reactionary rhetoric
in the forefront of their minds, the wisest course on divisive social questions
will almost invariably be to stay their hands, at least until the matter becomes
relatively noncontroversial.111 That mentality would have deprived the nation
of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, Brown v. Board of
Education, Miranda v. Arizona, Loving v. Virginia, Texas v. Johnson, and many
other luminous achievements in our constitutional universe.112
There seems little doubt that at least some of the Justices have internalized
reactionary rhetoric in high-profile, potentially equality-enhancing contexts.
To take only the most obvious example, one way of understanding the
Supreme Court’s recent refusal to invalidate all state prohibitions of same-sex
marriage is that it stemmed from a desire on the part of some Justices to avoid
a potentially perverse outcome.113 Even in the unlikely event that the Justices
themselves are inured to reactionary rhetoric, it is important to appreciate that
such language may still shape–and perhaps misshape–constitutional doctrine.
Advocates themselves may independently decline to file lawsuits seeking
constitutional change because they fear any judicial victory would prove
ephemeral. The mainstream gay rights legal community in 2009, for example,
so feared filing a federal law suit seeking same-sex marriage that several
organizations collectively released a press release called: “Make Change, Not
Lawsuits.”114 This remarkable document can be understood as a paean to
perversity, warning that “[m]ost lawsuits will likely set us all back.”115 Maybe.
But it is also possible, of course, that the federal lawsuit filed by David Boies
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See Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75
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Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964).
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); W. Va. Bd. of
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and Loving) that the Supreme Court does not merely interpret the Constitution to impose
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See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). Although the Court dodged Hollingsworth
on standing grounds, the standing argument (for reasons too intricate to explain here)
actually seems to have held more force in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013),
where the Court invalidated the Defense of Marriage Act. I discount, but do not wholly
dismiss, the notion that jeopardy-based arguments drove the Court’s non-decision in
Hollingsworth because DOMA enjoyed a similar democratic imprimatur to the state
prohibitions that exist throughout the country.
Press Release, ACLU et al., Make Change, Not Lawsuits 3 (May 27, 2009), http://www
.aclu.org/files/pdfs/lgbt/make_change_20090527.pdf.
Id.
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and Ted Olson in May 2009, over the vociferous objections of many within the
gay rights community, played a meaningful role in elevating the same-sex
marriage issue to new levels of salience among the public, including among
federal judges.116 Advocates who take an overly jaded approach to questions of
judicial capacity may, thus, end up fulfilling their own prophecies.117
Some critics would surely respond that the Justices, human beings that
they are, will lack the knowledge at the time of issuing a decision to assess
whether an egalitarian opinion will in fact give rise to perversity, futility, or
jeopardy. Given that uncertainty, a host of difficult questions arise. How do we
want Justices to err when adjudicating the rights of marginalized citizens?
When the Justices believe that a minority group’s constitutional rights have
been infringed, do we want the Supreme Court to risk overprotection (that is,
issue opinions that do not achieve their intended effect) or to risk
underprotection (that is, decline to issue opinions that would have achieved
their intended effect) of those groups? Important as these questions are, they
do not lend themselves to a systematic, universal answer precisely because they
involve so many moving parts. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that
any satisfying answer to those questions must account for the predominant
inclinations of the current Justices and of those Justices who will win Supreme
Court confirmation in the future. In my own view, it seems highly unlikely that
Supreme Court Justices will soon become wide-eyed radicals who repeatedly
issue equality-enhancing opinions that clash violently with overwhelming
portions of society. Instead, it seems far more probable that Justices are
temperamentally predisposed to make mistakes in the opposite direction,
demonstrating excessive caution before bringing new groups into the
constitutional fold. If that intuition is correct, Supreme Court Justices may be
precisely the sorts of people who are already most receptive—and most
vulnerable—to the wages of reactionary rhetoric.
conclusion
During the last few decades, liberal law professors have increasingly
invoked reactionary rhetoric in assessing the Supreme Court’s capacity to
promote change on divisive social issues. This essay does not call on leftleaning academics to purge such language from their vocabularies; some
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instances surely exist when using that language is warranted. Yet, the
prevalence with which reactionary rhetoric appears in contemporary academic
discourse suggests that law professors might do well to demonstrate greater
selectivity in marshaling that language. The Supreme Court possesses
significantly greater capacity to engender progressive social change than
reactionary rhetoric’s suffusion of academic discourse would suggest. If
liberally-inclined Supreme Court Justices were to internalize academia’s
reactionary rhetoric, they may decline to issue opinions that would protect
marginalized members of society—even if their sincere constitutional
commitments indicated such opinions were appropriate, and even if those
opinions would have ultimately proven successful in realizing their intended
aims. The absence of those opinions could have catastrophic consequences for
society’s most vulnerable members.118 In order to decrease the likelihood of
these non-decisions, liberal law professors should contemplate expending
greater intellectual energy on identifying instances that underscore the
Supreme Court’s ability to promote social change in highly contested arenas.119
All of this is to insist, in other words, that liberal legal academia’s zeal for
reactionary rhetoric demands a reaction.
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